{"id":1343,"date":"2026-09-07T07:40:06","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T12:40:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/?p=1343"},"modified":"2026-09-07T07:44:12","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T12:44:12","slug":"constitutional-precedent-legal-reality-prevails-over-formalism-in-demands-for-protection-of-constitutional-guarantees","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/constitutional-precedent-legal-reality-prevails-over-formalism-in-demands-for-protection-of-constitutional-guarantees\/","title":{"rendered":"Constitutional Precedent: legal reality prevails over formalism in demands for protection of constitutional guarantees"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Background and procedural conflict<\/u><\/strong><\/h5>

In a Consumer Protection process, the Ninth Circuit Civil Court, through Judgment No. 12-15 of March 14, 2025, jointly condemned the promoter, trust company, and banking entity MERCANTIL BANCO, S.A., to pay a sum of money, interest and costs.<\/p>

Subsequently, the Third Superior Court modified the judgment solely to exclude the trust company from the conviction, leaving the conviction against the developer and MERCANTIL BANCO, S.A. unchanged.<\/p>

When the appeal for protection of constitutional rights was filed against the first instance judgment, the First Superior Court did not admit it, arguing that said judgment had been “modified” on appeal and, therefore, the appeal for protection of constitutional rights should be directed against that ruling and consequently filed directly with the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice.<\/p>

By resolution of March 25, 2026, the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved an appeal filed by EVANS GROUP, representing MERCANTIL BANCO, S.A., overturning the resolution issued by the First Superior Court, which had dismissed the petition for constitutional protection against Judgment No. 12-15 of March 14, 2025.<\/p>

The decision establishes an important precedent in constitutional procedural law, clarifying when a second-instance ruling should be considered a true modification of the first-instance judgment, and when, despite using the term “modifies,” it merely has confirmatory effects for one of the parties.<\/p>

\u00a0<\/p>

Criteria of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice<\/u><\/strong><\/h5>

The Plenary revoked the inadmissibility and ordered the First Superior Court to admit the action for protection of constitutional guarantees, concluding that the admissibility of the protection cannot depend exclusively on the terminology used in the operative part of a judgment.<\/p>

To determine which act is subject to challenge, it is necessary to analyze the actual effects of the judicial decision on the affected party.<\/p>

In this specific case, the Court concluded that:<\/p>

  1. The legal status of MERCANTIL BANCO, S.A. remained unchanged.<\/li>
  2. The joint and several liability, interest, and costs remained in effect.<\/li>
  3. The modification introduced on appeal only benefited one co-defendant.<\/li><\/ol>

    With respect to the bank, the appeal decision was materially confirmatory.<\/p>

    With respect to the bank, the second instance decision was materially confirmatory.<\/p>

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    Importance for constitutional practice<\/u><\/strong><\/h5>

    The precedent establishes that a modification by a second instance court does not necessarily shift the object of the amparo (constitutional protection) action.<\/p>

    If an appellate court ruling uses the term “modifies” but that modification is subjective (exclusion of a co-defendant) and leaves the client’s obligations and burdens identical, the challengeable act remains the original first-instance order, as this is the one that retains the actual harmful force. In other words, when the change introduced by the appellate court is solely subjective or affects only third parties, and the obligations imposed on the plaintiff remain intact, the challengeable act continues to be the original ruling that produces the constitutional violation.<\/p>

    The proper object of constitutional review should be the original order that actually and effectively violates the fundamental rights of the party, regardless of any subjective modifications affecting third-party co-defendants.<\/p>

    Furthermore, the full court emphasized that requiring an appeal of the second-instance ruling in these cases could render the amparo (constitutional protection) ineffective, leaving the original harmful order in force.<\/p>

    This decision strengthens the principles of effective judicial protection, access to justice, and legal certainty, preventing constitutional actions from being rejected based on overly formalistic interpretations.<\/p>

    The ruling reaffirms that courts must examine the substantive content and legal effects of judicial decisions, rather than limiting themselves to the literal meaning of expressions such as “modifies,” “reforms,” \u200b\u200bor “revokes.”<\/p>

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    CONCLUSION<\/strong><\/h5>

    The Supreme Court’s Plenary session ruling of March 25, 2026, constitutes an important precedent for Panamanian constitutional litigation.<\/p>

    Its main contribution lies in recognizing that the determination of the act subject to challenge in a Constitutional Protection action must be based on the actual legal effects on the party, and not solely on the formal wording of the judicial decision.<\/p>

    This criterion helps ensure the effectiveness of constitutional justice and prevents fundamental rights from being left unprotected by overly ritualistic procedural interpretations.<\/p>

    At EVANS GROUP, we remain committed to the strategic defense of our clients’ rights and interests, promoting innovative legal solutions and effective protection before the courts.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Background and procedural conflict In a Consumer Protection process, the Ninth Circuit Civil Court, through Judgment No. 12-15 of March 14, 2025, jointly condemned the promoter, trust company, and banking entity MERCANTIL BANCO, S.A., to pay a sum of money, interest and costs. Subsequently, the Third Superior Court modified the judgment solely to exclude the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1343","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog-en"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1343","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1343"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1343\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1347,"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1343\/revisions\/1347"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1343"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1343"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/evansgrouplaw.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1343"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}